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J’Accuse… 
 
The contemporary field of cultural studies has little interest in, or engagement with, 
quantitative analysis. If you don’t believe me, here are some numbers.  
 
As preparation for this chapter – which explores the reasons for this disengagement and 
its detrimental implications – I conducted a content analysis of 130 refereed articles 
published in six recent editions of three major cultural studies journals (Cultural Studies, 
European Journal of Cultural Studies and International Journal of Cultural Studies1). In this 
analysis, I counted all and any references made to either primary quantitative data (i.e. 
author-generated) or secondary quantitative data (i.e. statistics produced by other 
academic, official or corporate sources) 2. 
 
The finding that thirty four percent of the articles contained some quantitative data may 
appear to weaken my initial assertion.  However, this headline figure gives a misleading 
impression of the prominence of statistical evidence in the corpus of material analysed. 
Articles that presented quantitative data more frequently referred to other people’s 
statistics rather than numbers the authors had collected themselves (29 percent of the 
articles presented secondary data, compared with 8 percent that presented primary data3). 
Furthermore, the presentation and discussion of quantitative evidence tended to be 
fleeting: in the 44 articles that contained any statistical data, the average amount of space 
dedicated to the presentation and discussion of the numbers accounted for less than 1 
                                                 
1 Cultural studies Volume (editions): 19 (4 to 6), 20(1 to 2, 4); European Journal of Cultural 
studies, 8 (2 to 4), 9 (1 to 3); International Journal of Cultural studies, 8 (2 to 4), 9 (1 to 3). 
2 I did not code all numerical references (e.g. ‘9/11’, ‘The Top Ten’ etc). To be included the 
numbers had to represent from some formal observation, collation and analysis. 
3 These are not mutually exclusive categories, which is why their addition exceeds 34 
percent.  
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percent of total article length (0.98 percent), which represents, on average, less than a 
fifth of a published page4.  
 
Quantitative content analysis was the most frequently conducted form of original 
statistical analysis (five of the ten original data collection exercises identified). In terms of 
secondary data, survey data was presented most (32 of the 57 presentations identified), 
followed by generic economic data (22 appearances). The sources of these secondary 
data were, respectively, ‘academic sources’ (23 appearances), ‘corporate sector sources’ 
(16 appearances), ‘national/ international official sources’ (13 appearances), ‘opinion 
polls’ (3 appearances) and ‘unclear’ (2 appearances).  
 
The numbers that were quoted were never challenged nor interrogated. Not a single 
methodological, epistemological or ontological question was raised about any of the 
statistical results presented. Furthermore, contextual information that is normally used to 
appraise the reliability and validity of quantitative data was almost always absent (e.g. 
sample size and procedures). In the 2,276 pages I scrutinized, I identified only one 
reference to a significance test.  
 
Such uncritical invocation of statistics could be indicative of a naïve acceptance, even 
reification, of the objectivity and authority of quantitative evidence. I am convinced this 
is not the case. Rather, I believe it further supports my initial point about a general 
disengagement and indifference in cultural studies towards quantitative modes of 
analysis. Although there may be occasions when the incidental use of a cherry-picked 
statistic can serve a general analytical (or rhetorical) function; in the main, the real 
intellectual work of cultural studies - the locations where meaningful reflexivity and 
debate is to be had - is seen to involve engaging with theoretical complexities or revelling 
in the richness of qualitative data.  
 
Such assumptions are so widely accepted in the field that they are rarely openly 
articulated, but there are occasions when they surface. Take, for example, Simon 
                                                 
4 It should also be appreciated that these averages were inflated by the presence of three 
articles that dedicated more than five pages each to the presentation and analysis of 
statistical evidence. If these ‘outlying values’ are excluded from the calculation, the average 
proportional presence of statistical data per-article drops to 0.75 percent. 
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During’s observation about the rising influence of ethnography in cultural studies 
research:  
 
‘It can be “quantitative”, which involves large-scale surveys and (usually) 
statistical analysis. However this kind of research ultimately belongs more to the 
social sciences than to cultural studies’ (2005: 23) 
 
In challenging this kind of demarcation, this chapter explores three themes: the reasons 
why quantitative analysis is deemed infra dig for cultural studies; the relevance of this 
enduring disengagement; and its restrictive implications for the field as a whole. In 
addressing these issues, however, I am not advocating quantification as a preferable or 
more superior mode of analysis. Indeed, I am antagonistic to epistemic prioritization of 
this kind; just as I am to its mirror opposite, which vaunts qualitative analysis as the only 
legitimate mode of analysis (Deacon et al., 1998).  As shall be explained, both 
perspectives are informed by a flawed and outmoded methodological determinism. 
 
Reasons 
 
To understand the reasons for cultural studies’ disengagement with quantitative methods 
there is a need to appreciate the broad and specific historical contexts in which the field 
emerged and established its presence. In wider terms, the rise of cultural studies in the 
1960s constituted just one condensation funnel in a multi-vortex tornado that 
transformed the human sciences. Across the disciplines, this period was marked by a 
resurgence in anti-positivism, in which earlier hermeneutic traditions were rediscovered, 
reasserted and extended (Morrison, 1998: chapter 4). In this new zeitgeist, positivist 
epistemology and methodology were not only identified as philosophically untenable but 
also as politically reactionary, complicit in the legitimization of capitalist exploitation, 
racism and sexism (for a recent statement of this position, see Steinmetz, 2005). 
Particularly influential in this respect were feminist critiques that identified andocentric 
traits in the development and application of statistical methods and, as a consequence, 
prescribed a methodological agenda orientated exclusively around qualitative methods 
(Cook and Fonow,1986; Miles, 1983; Stanley and Wise, 1983; Harding, 1987; Lather, 
1988; Reinharz,1992). Such critiques resonated powerfully with the political inclinations 
of cultural studies pioneers, and their affiliation to humanist Marxism, interest in identity 
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politics and support for subaltern groups (Inglis, 1993: 131). Thus, the field readily and 
willingly aligned itself with what van de Berg has disparagingly labelled as ‘the 
epistemological left’ (2005). 
 
There are additional, specific reasons why an elective antipathy to quantitative methods 
became part of the rote and routine of cultural studies. All of the key founding figures 
had backgrounds in literary studies, rather than the social sciences, and their intellectual 
orientations and methodological predilections soon became formalised in the teaching 
and research activity of the field. In theoretical terms, this disciplinary infusion helped 
vitalise previously moribund debates about communication and media, providing new 
and exciting ways of conceptualising the ‘production, circulation, distribution/ 
consumption [and] reproduction’ of meaning (Hall 1973/ 1993: 91). Carey characterised 
this change as a shift from a ‘transmission’ to ‘ritual’ view of communication, which saw 
‘the original or highest manifestation of communication not in the transmission of 
intelligent information but in the construction and maintenance of an ordered, 
meaningful cultural world that can serve as a control and container for human action’ 
(1985: 19).   
 
Methodologically, however, this change provided an additional reason for rejecting 
quantitative methods, as their development and deployment had been a central feature of 
the dominant ‘transmission’ paradigm (Gitlin, 1978).  For example, in a chapter outlining 
the conduct of Media Studies at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
studies in the late 1970s, Stuart Hall confidently asserted: ‘Audience-based survey 
research, based on the large statistical sample using fixed-choice questionnaires, has at 
last reached the terminal point it has long deserved – at least as a serious sociological 
enterprise’ (Hall, 1980: 120, quoted by Morrison, 1998) 
 
In this new fixation with questions of representation and meaning, traditional 
quantitative methods were rejected as intractably inflexible and ill-conceived. 
Quantitative content analysis, with its emphasis on cross-textual denotative aggregation, 
was criticised for ignoring the imminent complexities of textual meaning and how it 
‘derives from relationships, oppositions and context rather than the quantity of 
references’ (McQuail, 1987: 189). Experiments and sample-surveys were shunned for 
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their failure to engage people’s with complex interior lives or their situated cultural and 
social experiences. As Inglis remarks: 
 
 ‘[O]ne is seeking out the presence and power of intersubjective meaning and 
value. These are not quantities in people’s heads, retrievable by social surveyors. 
They are the evaluative atmosphere or ethos which the members of a society 
must breathe in and out by virtue of being human and sociable… Common or 
intersubjective meanings and values, therefore, are not… available to hard data 
and social-survey analysis’ (1993: 148). 
 
An important element of such critiques is the proposition that frequency of occurrence 
should not be seen as the definitive measure of significance or, indeed, signification (e.g. 
Burgelin, 1968). Although cultural studies defined itself, at least initially, as a political 
project asking major questions about capitalist hegemony (Hartley, 2003; Rojek, 2002), it 
sought to do so by interrogating the particularities of culture rather than its generalities. 
This orientation remains prevalent to this day. For example, in her recent book on 
cultural studies research methods, Ann Gray emphasizes the ‘uniqueness’ of textual and 
ethnographic investigations and their incompatibility with traditional social scientific 
concerns about ‘generalizability’ and ‘representativeness’ (Gray, 2002: 74, quoted in 
Barker, 2005). In a similar vein, John Hartley described his methodology for his study of 
journalism, modernity and popular culture: 
 
‘I tend to concentrate on what I take to be emblematic texts or moments, using 
these to tease out the implications and significations involved, rather than 
attempting objective methodologies like sampling, surveying or statistics. This is 
because I am interested in meanings, which are rarely expressed in the form of 
generalities. You can reduce a kiss to information for the benefit of scientific 
enquiry, of course, but it is not a method which yields complete understanding of 
what a given kiss means in specific circumstances to its participants and 
onlookers. So the methods employed in this book are documentary, historical, 
argumentative, metaphorical and textual’ (1996: 6) 
 
More recently, Hartley has also acknowledged the general indifference of cultural studies 
to questions of ‘scale’: 
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‘Thus, where sociology and anthropology were generalising, classifying and 
theorising disciplines, cultural studies retained some of its literary-critical mind-
set, with a devotion to detailed and passionate engagement with the particular. 
(2003: 124) 
 
This emphasis upon particularities and emblems helps identify a further reason why the 
field has been so resistant to quantitative methods. Cultural studies is orientated to the 
deconstruction of meaning, whereas statistics are fundamentally about the construction 
of meaning. Numbers do not arrive unbidden, from thin air; they rely on defining and 
operationalizing concepts and categories, and choosing and applying procedures. This 
constructive process is often obscured in the presentation of the resulting data, which 
results in the simulation of ‘an objectivity that in reality depends on the legitimacy of the 
questions asked’ (Gadamer, 1975: 268).  Both of these factors are guaranteed to invite 
the scepticism rather than the interest of cultural studies’ analysts, although it is 
significant to note that this rarely extends to a detailed deconstruction of actual statistical 
evidence.  Most typically, it amounts to a high-handed dismissal of quantification per se, as 
inevitably lacking ecological validity.  
 
A final point of relevance here is that the field’s resistance to quantitative analysis varies. 
Almost all of the statistics I identified in my content analysis of recent cultural studies 
journals were descriptive statistics, that is, the numbers were used to ‘describe’ wider 
social, economic and cultural trends.  Their uncritical use suggests a degree of tolerance 
for this kind of empirical evidence, even if its contribution is marginalized and 
uninterrogated. Such acceptance does not extend, however, to statistical inference: the 
realm where statistics are used for hypothesis testing and extrapolating wider population 
estimates on the basis of what has been observed (Deacon et al, 2007, chapter 5). 
Certainly, this is the facet of statistics that has attracted most criticism from feminist 
theorists (e.g. Hughes, 1995). Two findings from the content analysis confirm this 
antipathy is shared in cultural studies: the almost complete lack of any reference to 
statistical significance tests, and the total absence of experimental research-based 
evidence. Tests for statistical significance make assumptions about the stability and 
predictability of social, cultural and psychological patterns (‘because we find it here, we 
can predict confidently its existence and extent elsewhere’). Experiments are methods 
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designed specifically to establish and measure causality.  Both propositions are an 
anathema to a field that is shaped, at root, by ‘the literary affirmation of human 
singularity’ (Inglis, 1993: 131) and that valorises the capriciousness, creativity and 
particularity of human expression. ‘Textual poachers’ are not amenable fodder for 
regression analysis. 
 
Relevance 
 
Having identified the main reasons for cultural studies’ resistance to quantitative modes 
of analysis, I now want to consider the relevance of this situation. This may seem a 
strange question to pose, as the criticisms outlined in the previous section would seem to 
be immutable. However, although a dismissal of quantification remains largely 
unchallenged in the cultural studies mainstream, elsewhere in the human sciences such 
assumptions have been subjected to considerable revision, particularly regarding the 
extent to which one can ‘read-off’ epistemologies and politics, on the basis of 
methodological choice.  
 
Reading off epistemology  
At the core of the hermeneutic turn in the 1960s and 1970s was an ‘incompatibility 
thesis’ (Howe, 1988: 10). This held that methodology and epistemology existed in an iron 
embrace, and as a consequence qualitative and quantitative methods could never be 
combined satisfactorily (e.g. Guba and Lincoln, 1982; Smith, 1983). More recently, 
however, interest has grown across many disciplines in the combination of qualitative 
and quantitative research methods, which suggests opinions have altered on the 
‘epistemology/ methodology’ link. The sociologist Alan Bryman has been at the 
foreground of debates about the reconcilability of qualitative-quantitative methods for 
many years (e.g. Bryman, 1988) and in a recent study examined (a) the prevalence of 
multi-method studies in refereed journals across the human sciences and (b) the views of 
senior academics on the pitfalls and benefits of combining qualitative and quantitative 
methods (Bryman, 2006). On the basis of this investigation, he concluded that, although 
pockets of resistance remain: 
 
‘[T]he paradigm wars [of previous decades] have been replaced by a period of 
paradigm peace. In this new era, there is a tendency to stress the compatibility 
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between quantitative and qualitative research and a pragmatic viewpoint which 
prioritizes using any approach that allows research questions to be answered 
regardless of its philosophical presuppositions’ (2006: 124). 
 
This shift in emphasis from ‘means’ to ‘ends’ is the product of several related 
developments. First, it can be seen as a measure of the success of the hermeneutic 
critique of positivism in the 1960s and 1970s. Without question, it was a vital 
intervention and few, if anyone, would now subscribe to beliefs about the objectivity and 
value freedom of statistical evidence; nor fail to appreciate the limitations of quantitative 
methods. However, once purged of their epistemological pretensions, quantitative 
methods become amenable for inclusion in more reflexive and interpretative research 
activity. Second, this interest in incorporating quantitative methods in multi-method 
investigations also reflects a growing appreciation of the limitations of interpretivism, in 
particular, concerns about the research issues it closes off, the methodological inhibitions 
it can create, and the spectres of solipsism and relativism that haunt the paradigm. Third, 
it has been argued that the incompatibility thesis overstates the antinomy of positivist-
orientated and interpretivist-orientated research concerns.  For example, Murdock notes 
that many qualitative and ethnographic studies within cultural studies, despite their 
resistance to more formal forms of statistical measurement, ‘often fall back on loose 
statements of how many people did or said something or how often’ (1997: 181) (see also 
Lewis, 1997). The legitimacy of this observation was confirmed by my own experiences 
in conducting the content analysis of recent cultural studies journals. Time and again, I 
encountered quasi-quantitative statements in the articles, not only in the presentation of 
qualitative empirical evidence, but also in authors’ general rhetorical and theoretical 
discourse. A small selection from the plethora of comments I encountered are set out in 
box 1, for illustrative purposes. My point in presenting them is not to suggest that they 
all needed more specific and rigorous quantification, but rather to demonstrate a 
prevalent, if tacit, acceptance that in political, analytical and rhetorical terms, ‘frequency 
of occurrence’ does count – even when it is not counted. 
 
 
Box 1: Quasi-quantification and cultural studies: some recent examples 
             (n.b. emphasis added in all cases) 
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‘In almost every instance, [the programme’s] wrongdoers fit this description’ 
 
‘The majority of quiz shows to emerge in recent years depend on “general/ academic” 
knowledge’ 
 
‘The Italian audience has been offered an increasing number of home-grown serials’ 
 
‘Most of the interviewed club culture practitioners… seemed acutely aware of these more general 
and, in particular, local contexts and instances of racialised power differentials in the 
City’s club culture economy’ 
 
‘In recent times we have witnessed a growing attention to global flows of information and 
telematics and their post colonial implications’ 
 
‘I was struck by the fact that almost all the interviewees spontaneously referred to [the 
programme]’ 
 
‘Technologically mediated communication is frequently only a supplementary mode of 
exchange supporting geographically dispersed family members’ 
 
‘There is certainly a well-established association between middle-class gay men and the 
gentrification of inner city housing stock’ 
 
‘The study of media pleasure was once widespread in media studies’ 
 
‘Not surprisingly, many of the interviewees saw economic globalization as an exploitative 
process’  
 
‘Some of our interviewees seemed to prefer not to get too immersed’ 
 
‘[the central character] was described almost unanimously as the embodiment of the new social 
group (or class) of career woman’ 
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Despite the general growth of interest in multi-method research in the human sciences - 
and indeed its popularity within related branches of communication and media studies – 
cultural studies remains strangely impervious to its appeal.  This is a surprisingly 
outmoded stance for a field that has long vaunted its cutting edge inter-disciplinarity and 
reflexivity. As Justin Lewis comments: 
 
‘Research within cultural studies has consistently been qualitative rather than 
quantitative… While such a preference was initially both well-conceived and 
fruitful, the lingering suspicion of numerical data has degenerated into habit. It is 
as if the argument with these methodologies was so comprehensively settled that 
one can be spared the time and effort of any further thought on the subject’ 
(1997: 84) 
 
In criticising this ‘doctrinal’ rejection of quantification, Lewis also questions whether 
quantitative audience research should be as readily dismissed for its theoretical 
inadequacies. For example, he argues that agenda setting research provides a ‘germ of an 
analytical model’ (1997: 93) with its interest in reality construction and analytical 
distinction between ‘deep ideological structures – the social encyclopaedia of common 
knowledge – and the more overtly ideological discourse of attitudes and opinions’ 
(1997:). Similarly, he applauds the cultivation analysis research of George Gerbner and 
colleagues, which ‘for all its shortcomings… remains the only comprehensive body of 
research to have systematically demonstrated that television plays a clearly defined 
hegemonic role in contemporary culture’ (1997: 89).  Furthermore, Lewis sees no reason 
why other public opinion data cannot be appropriated and integrated within ‘a thorough 
going analysis of the evolving ideological character of cultural industries and institutions,’ 
and be used ‘to provide the rough contours of a complex ideological map’ (1997: 89).  
 
Reading off Politics 
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Just as views about the intrinsic epistemological flaws of quantification are being 
challenged, so questions are being raised about the accusations that statistics are always 
the refuge of reactionaries.   
 
As noted, feminist critics have been very influential in this political assault on 
quantification (e.g. Belenky et al., 1986; Reinhartz, 1984; Harding, 1987; Gilligan, 1982). 
For example, Hughes (1995) argues that ‘The politics of domination are integrated into 
the scientific method and used as a political agent for those in power’ (p.395). She 
supports this appraisal by providing fascinating historical details about the early inventors 
of statistics and their broader intellectual and political concerns: 
 
‘Statistical methods were invented as a way of knowing by men motivated by 
eugenic politics… While enabling investigation in every field of study, statistical 
analysis has also aided in the social construction of dominance by giving scientific 
authority to the construction of reified categories which lead to the 
objectification of oppressed, subjugated groups’ (1995: 401). 
 
These are grave accusations. However, I have two reservations about her critique. First, 
although there have been many occasions when the analysis of ‘statistical difference’ has 
been used to objectify and stigmatise marginalised groups, it does not follow that this is 
invariably the case. Indeed, it has been argued by other critical scholars that the 
identification of difference is a vital component for democratic progress (see, in 
particular, Nancy Fraser’s work on the politics of recognition [1995]). On a more applied 
level, it is widely recognised within the public policy literature that the identification, 
naming and categorisation of marginalised social groups is an essential precondition for 
them to receive appropriate support, resources and respect. Second, Hughes provides 
many examples where statistics were developed for patriarchal and racist purposes, but 
fails to demonstrate precisely what it is within the statistical procedures themselves that 
are inherently inscribed by prejudicial values. Furthermore, couched within her critique is 
a major concession: 
 
‘This does not make the mathematics incorrect, or nullify knowledge that has 
been gained by the use of statistical analysis’ (1995: 396) 
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Her attack, in other words, is focused on the political (mis)uses of these procedures and 
delusions of their creators, rather than their intrinsic deficiencies. Quantification is thus 
declared guilty by association, which is rather like condemning the development of the 
internal combustion engine because of its use in machineries of war; neglecting its equally 
vital role in improving the efficacy of ambulance services.  
 
This may seem a trite analogy, but the essential point would be supported by those who 
question the historical veracity of the claim that statistics have always privileged 
patriarchy. Ann Oakley (1998) warns against the ‘dangers of simple histories’, and argues 
that it is not ‘clearly the case that “quantitative” methods have served no relevant 
feminist goal’ (1998: 721-22). Against Hughes’ invocation of eugenicists such as Francis 
Galton, Karl Pearson and Ronald Fisher, Oakley cites a long list of feminist reformers 
like Jane Adams, Harriet Martineau, Florence Nightingale and Beatrice Webb who all 
conducted sample survey research to generate ‘policy-relevant knowledge as ammunition 
for social reform’ (1998 : 722). A particularly valuable aspect of Oakley’s critique is how 
it highlights that what is sometimes referred to in an undifferentiated way as a ‘feminist’ 
methodological critique, is actually based on a specific form of feminism: the ‘difference’ 
feminism of theorists such as Carol Gilligan, which subscribes to the existence of 
fundamental psycho-biological differences between women and men. This second wave 
feminism has been subjected to considerable subsequent criticism by other feminist 
theorists (e.g. Lister, 2003), and many would concur with Oakley’s identification of the 
damaging political implications of such methodological monism: 
 
 
’The case against quantitative ways of knowing is based on a rejection of reason 
and science as masculine and an embracing of experience as feminine; but this is 
essentialist thinking that buys into the very paradox that it protests about… The 
result is likely to be the construction of ‘difference’ feminism where women are 
described as owning distinctive ways of thinking, knowing and feeling, and the 
danger is that these new moral characterisations will play into the hands of those 
who use gender as a means of discriminating against women’ (1998:725) 
 
A related point here is the unquestioned assumption that qualitative methods are always 
used for progressive purposes. For example, in his definitive study of the politics of 
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marketing of the British Labour party, Dominic Wring (2005) demonstrates how a self-
styled modernising tendency used qualitative focus group studies strategically to justify 
the jettisoning of social-democratic policies and shift the party towards the political right.  
Apart from questioning the rigour of these studies, Wring demonstrates that a major 
reason for their appeal and influence for the labour leadership in the 1980s was their 
qualitative nature. During this period, the party leadership was desperate to connect with 
the concerns and aspirations of key marginal voters and focus groups were seen as 
offering a magical solution to this conundrum. Not only did these studies amplify the 
influence of these ‘quality minorities’ on the shaping of party policy to the detriment of  
others, the findings were also used to legitimise a centralisation of control, erode the 
party’s democratic structures and give prominence to disturbingly reactionary discourses. 
For example, in 1987 the then Communications Director of the party used focus group 
findings to claim that Labour was out of touch and associated with ‘gays’, ‘Marxists’ and 
‘strange things’ (Wring, 2006: 79). 
 
Restrictive implications 
 
Implicit in all of the criticisms I have raised is a belief that cultural studies’ aversion to 
quantification is closing off academic avenues and political options. In this section, I 
want to identify more precisely what I believe these restrictive implications to be. 
 
The first relates to methodological difficulties that can be created by imprecise ‘quasi-
quantification’. As noted, it is possible to detect a latent quantitative impulse in many 
pieces of cultural studies research, but there are occasions where this reluctance to 
engage in systematic counting creates analytical vagueness, and even internal 
contradictions and logical inconsistencies. Graham Murdock furnishes an illustration of 
this point with reference to a study of audience responses to a television drama 
documentary about IRA bombings in Birmingham (Roscoe et al, 1995). Although the 
study was based on the qualitative analysis of twelve focus group interviews, Murdock 
identifies two pivotal quantitative statements in the analysis: 
 
• “There are many occasions in the group discussions where participants drew on 
their classified group membership to inform their reading” (Roscoe et al. 1995: 
96; emphasis added) 
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• “There were many instances of participants moving outside of the particular 
‘interest’ and ‘non-interest’ classifications used in this study as they made sense of 
the issues.’ (Roscoe et al. 1995: 98; emphasis added) 
 
As Murdock notes, without additional quantitative elaboration, these statements appear 
mutually contradictory: 
 
‘We are not told how often each practice occurred, whether one was more 
common than the other, who was most likely to engage in them and in which 
contexts, or even whether they were different people or the same individuals at 
different points of the discussion. All of these features of the situation could be 
very simply expressed in numerical form. Far from reducing the complexity of 
the analysis, calculating these figures would deepen it by establishing the 
patterning of practice and by suggesting new dimensions of interpretation’ 
(Murdock, 1997: 182) 
 
A second restrictive implication of the cultural studies’ disengagement with quantification 
is that it limits the capacity of the field to deconstruct statistical evidence on its own terms.  
This displays an odd incuriosity for an enterprise so wedded to deconstruction. More 
seriously, it can become a form of political abdication. To dismiss all statistics as artificial 
constructs is to assume that all are as bad as each other, which is patently a fatuous 
generalisation. It is certainly true that statistics do not speak for themselves and should 
never be taken on face value. They need to be read critically. But, to acknowledge the 
constructed nature of statistics is not the same as saying they are inevitably corrupt. The 
validity of numerical evidence is determined by the competence of its conceptualisation, 
the meticulousness of its collation and the rigour in its interpretation. These can only be 
ascertained by close and careful scrutiny. Moreover, we cannot ignore the pervasive 
belief that numbers have greater scientific rigour and objectivity than other kinds of 
evidence, however much we might want to challenge it. Indeed, it is because statistics 
have this rhetorical power that critical analysts must have the capability to engage in an 
imminent critique of statistics when identifying and confronting their rhetorical and 
political abuses. As Inglis remarks: 
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‘[A] student of culture must be statistically numerate. This is even more 
intractably true when the student is preoccupied by questions of power… Power, 
crude coercive power, will always try to wrest numbers for its own purposes, like 
the bastard it is. Freedom will always oppose it, and discover the uses and abuses 
of statistics with which to affront power’ (1993: 123) 
 
A third restrictive implication of avoiding quantification is that it disengages cultural 
studies from wider public policy debates. For example, Tony Bennett has long argued 
that if cultural studies is to have any political influence in the formation of cultural policy, 
it must have the capability to understand and engage with ‘governmental calculations’ 
(1992: 35). One example he provides is of the need to be able to challenge official 
‘performance indicators’ in cultural policy that are rooted in economic rationalist criteria: 
 
‘In this regard, people with the capacity to do sophisticated statistical and 
economic work, have a major contribution to make to work at the cultural 
studies/ policy interface – perhaps more than those who engage solely in cultural 
critique. (1992: 35) 
 
 A similar point has been advanced by Angela McRobbie in her criticism of the tendency 
within cultural studies to dismiss empiricism (along with ethnography and ‘experience’) 
as “[an] artificially coherent narrative fiction”. In her view, such purism makes it difficult 
for researchers  
 
“to participate in facts and figures” oriented policy debates, or indeed in relation 
to the social problem whose roots seemed to lie in innovative cultural practices, 
for example, the rise of rave and dance cultures and the consumption among 
young people of E’s (i.e. Ecstacy). It has instead been left to sociologists like 
Jason Ditton in Glasgow to do the dirtier work of developing policies on youth 
cultures like rave, which necessitate having access to reliable facts, figures and 
even ‘ethnographic accounts’ to be able to argue with angry councillors, police 
and assorted moral guardians” (1996:  337-8). 
 
A fourth major limitation of non-engagement with quantitative methods is the ability of 
the field to adequately address questions of power. As discussed, cultural studies 
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privileges fine-grained analysis. This is valuable in many respects, not least in offering a 
corrective to over-generalised and deterministic structural analyses of power. However, a 
theoretical and methodological orientation that is exclusively orientated to micro agency 
and complexity can easily lead to a negation of the structural forces and inequalities that 
circumscribe these activities (Ferguson and Golding, 1997: xxvi). This can then 
transform into overly optimistic celebrations of the semiotic autonomy of cultural 
consumers and the ‘cool’ of capitalist culture (McGuigan, 2006). As Oakley notes, with 
regard to feminist research: 
 
‘Women and other minority groups, above all, need ‘quantitative’ research, 
because without this it is difficult to distinguish between personal experience and 
collective oppression. Only large-scale comparative data can determine to what 
extent the situations of men and women are structurally differentiated’ (1999: 
251) 
 
The incorporation of extensive methods also provides a more legitimate basis for 
extrapolating implications beyond the particular, which remains a latent impulse in much 
cultural studies’ work, whatever might be said about the evils of generalization. Crucially, 
it would provide a corrective to what John Hartley acknowledges as the ‘not entirely 
positive habit’ cultural studies has inherited from literary studies of universalising from 
particularities (2003: 124), 
 
It is important to appreciate that the combination of qualitative-quantitative methods is 
not just about providing checks and balances to the excesses of each. We should also be 
alive to the creative possibilities of their combination, in which insights and findings 
from one strand inform directly the design and development of others. An excellent 
example of the fruitful combination of qualitative and quantitative methods is offered by 
Livingstone et al.’s research into audience reception of audience participation talk shows. 
In the first phase of their research, a series of focus group interviews were conducted in 
conjunction with a textual analysis to explore the complex relations between ‘reader, text 
and context’ in this genre (Livingstone et al., 1994: 376, Livingstone and Lunt, 1994). 
These were followed up by a survey of a random, representative sample 3000 adults, who 
were asked to fill in a self-completion questionnaire that inquired about their viewing of, 
and views about, these TV talk-shows.  
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The results of the focus discussions directly informed the design of the questionnaire: 
insights derived from unstructured questioning provided guidance for subsequent 
structured questioning. Furthermore, the aim of the second extensive phase of the 
research was intended to test the general applicability and representativeness of the initial 
conclusions. This was because, in the authors’ view, questions about the generalisability 
of findings from small-scale qualitative reception studies were a matter that had ‘largely 
been avoided’ in previous focus-group based studies (Livingstone et al., op.cit: 376). 
Finally, although these different methods produced many complementary insights into 
audience perspectives about TV talk shows, in some areas they generated unique 
perspectives. On the one hand, ‘the focus group interviews identified more complex 
connections between text and reception, [and] identified contradictions within audience 
readings’ (ibid.). On the other hand, the self-completion questionnaire survey 
‘highlighted what had been missed in the focus group analysis, namely, the importance of 
the viewers’ age compared to, say, gender or social class’ (ibid.).  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This discussion has examined the reasons, relevance and restrictive implications of 
cultural studies’ disengagement with quantitative analysis. Some may reject my criticisms 
as being yet another example of an attack from a hostile sociological ‘outsider’, but this 
would misrepresent my view of the field and ignore the fact that many of the concerns I 
raise have also been articulated by theorists more closely associated with cultural studies 
(e.g. McRobbie, 1996; Lewis, 1997; Inglis, 1993; Bennett, 1992; Livingstone et al, 1994). 
 
It is true that my discussion has focused exclusively upon what quantitative methods can 
bring to cultural studies.  In view of this, I would like to end on a more positive note, and 
invite consideration of what cultural studies could bring to quantitative analysis. It is 
undoubtedly the case that statistics can often be dry, prosaic and of such banality as to be 
prime candidates for what a sarcastic journalist once defined as the W.I.N.D. award 
(‘Well I Never Did!’). I am convinced that ‘the cultural studies imagination’ has much to 
contribute to enriching the rationale, design, presentation and interpretation of 
quantitative evidence. But this can only be achieved by waking up to broader 
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developments in the human sciences and embracing the potential of these methods 
rather than fixating on their limitations. 
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